

CONSULTATION NOTE

May 23, 2025

Subject: The benefits of adding a **direct settlement** approach to the ceasefire negotiations with Hamas

Direct settlement, from Israel's perspective, is meant to behaviorally cleanse the Gaza strip, while simultaneously undermining Hamas.

One key problem has been leaving those in Gaza willing to cooperate with Israel under the threat of injury by Hamas.

While there is high level support in Israel for American proposals to remove population from Gaza generally, it is also important to advise against concentrating the behavioral problem in Gaza by potentially facilitating removal of those most likely to cooperate, while leaving behind those most likely to resume conflict in the future.

More fundamentally, getting a real peace with a remaining Gazan population is likely more important from Israel's perspective than ceasefires. The latter benefit Hamas much more by providing time to reconstitute their ability to attack Israel (i.e. to "reload"); Israel only benefits from the release of hostages during a ceasefire, but there is much more demanded of Israel than merely to stop firing

A significant part of getting a more stable peace as suggested here is predicated on work by several others, in particular Einat Wilf, who has written extensively about how a "Right of Return" perpetuates the conflict between Palestinians and Israel. The problem is exacerbated by the U.N.'s creating a seemingly endless, now decades long, "refugee" status for many Palestinians.

To address the preceding considerations, the following steps are recommended:

- (1) Inducements which could be offered to any Gazan person, in particular those willing to obtain aid from the U.S.-Israeli Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF):
 - (a) Gazans willing to obtain an individual settlement would be segregated to safe areas of Gaza protected by Israeli troops.

(b) An individual settlement agreement would grant the signer citizenship in a new Gaza state, and, importantly from a practical sense, act as a permanent visa for those who sign to enable them to return when they wish. The exits and reentries would be through Israel. (The evolution of a Gazan state could encompass a range of options, beginning with being a protectorate of Israel.)

(c) Israel might promote, through the U.S., a financial compensation regime independent of Israel. Such compensation would be made on a family basis, with only those members in agreement, by whatever deadline, receiving a portion of any payout.

As previously published, this might be accomplished by setting a requirement that any entities willing to fund the rebuilding of Gaza first produce funds for potential claims settlement. This can be seen as a type of insurance, since it might lead to greatly reduced risk of new construction being damaged in yet another conflict involving Gaza. Providing funds for resettlement/evacuation could also be required.

(d) As further inducement, earlier signers would have first rights on rebuilt properties, e.g. as to location or other selected features.

(2) Settlement agreements would first be offered to individual Gazans who have been assessed to have "clean hands", based on the behavioral principle that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior.

However, further rounds of behavioral segregation to other protected areas of Gaza could be offered to those who defect from Hamas, e.g. those who had been more recently recruited for pay.

(a) The agreement would specify that the signer would give up a right of return to long lost property in Israel and no longer consider him/herself to be a "refugee", from Israeli lands.

(b) The signer would also disavow radical Islam and pledge to work against any teaching in schools, mosques, or other areas that promoted verbal incitement or violence towards Jews, Christians, Zionists, other Muslim faiths, or any other groups in any offensive manner. Zion, as a refuge for Jews, would be fully accepted, without regard to how borders and other political arrangements might evolve in the future.

(c) Those Gazans willing to accept direct settlements with Israel would be physically segregated and protected within Gaza, or free to leave the country and return when conditions permit.

(d) Those proven through valid due process to have violated the agreements could be stripped of citizenship and deported to other areas inside or outside of Gaza.

(3) The concentration of those with problem behaviors should be temporary. Those who survive the current Gideon's Chariot operation by Israel would be self-selecting for resettlement elsewhere, e.g. per the suggestion of POTUS Trump, or kept in areas of Gaza separate from those Gazans willing to settle with Israel.

Conclusion

A two-phase resettlement approach based on behavioral selection of those willing to settle a casus belli should maximize gain from the presently increased military pressure.

The Gazans who are agreeable could forgo a very unrealistic and highly unpleasant conflict in return for property benefits in a rebuilt Gaza, as well as possible compensation, most likely on a family level, for claimed property losses. Even if there is no real legal basis for such compensation, the behavioral value for a settlement could be well worth the price.

Hamas would be undermined by losing control of some portion of the population. Furthermore, the suggestion that additional aid groups be allowed to operate in Gaza ("Framework for Negotiating an Agreement to a Permanent Ceasefire: ... Aid will be distributed through agreed upon channels that will include the United Nations and Red Crescent") could serve to counter predicted criticism that the agreements were to some extent coerced, i.e. predicated on a willingness to accept GHF aid. With multiple options, in effect an election is being held on Gaza's future without any permission from or involvement by Hamas.

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