
CONSULTATION NOTE

May 23, 2025

Subject: The benefits of adding a **direct settlement** approach to the ceasefire negotiations with Hamas

Direct settlement, from Israel's perspective, is meant **to behaviorally cleanse the Gaza strip**, while simultaneously undermining Hamas.

One **key problem** has been **leaving those in Gaza willing to cooperate with Israel under the threat of injury by Hamas**.

It is also important to advise against concentrating the behavioral problem in Gaza by potentially facilitating removal of those most likely to cooperate, while leaving behind those most likely to resume conflict in the future.

A significant part of getting a more stable peace, as suggested here, is predicated on work by several others, in particular Einat Wilf, who has written extensively about how a **"Right of Return" perpetuates the conflict between Palestinians and Israel.**

The problem is exacerbated by the U.N.'s creating a seemingly endless, now decades long, "refugee" status for many Palestinians.

To address the preceding considerations, the following steps are recommended:

Selection

(1) Direct settlement should first be offered to individual Gazans who have been assessed to have "clean hands", based on the behavioral principle that **past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior.**

(2) Further rounds of behavioral segregation to other protected areas of Gaza could be offered to those who defect from Hamas, e.g. those who had been more recently recruited for pay.

(3) Those who continue to resist direct agreement, but without any violent history, could be allowed to depart to agreeable foreign destinations without any guarantee of return.

Inducements

(a) Gazans willing to obtain an individual settlement would be **segregated to safe areas of Gaza** protected by Israeli troops.

(b) **An individual settlement agreement would grant** the signer **citizenship** in a new Gaza polity, and,

(c) importantly from a practical sense, **act as a passport for those who sign to enable them to leave and return to Gaza.**

(d) As further inducement, **earlier signers would have first rights on rebuilt properties**, e.g. as to location or other selected features.

Caveats

(a) The agreement would specify that **the signer would give up a right of return to claimed long lost property in Israel,**

(b) **and no longer consider him/herself to be a "refugee" from Israeli lands.**

(c) The signer would also **disavow radical Islam**

(d) and **pledge to work against any teaching** in schools, mosques, or other areas **that promoted verbal incitement or violence** towards Jews, Christians, Zionists, other Muslim faiths, or any other groups in any offensive manner.

(e) Israel, as state with a **core function as a refuge for Jews** would be fully accepted.

Further inducements

(a) Israel might promote, through the U.S., **a financial compensation regime independent of Israel.**

(b) Such compensation might be made **on a family basis for family property**, with only those members in agreement, by whatever deadline, receiving a portion of any payout.

(c) As previously published, this might be accomplished by setting a requirement that **any entities willing to fund the rebuilding of Gaza first produce funds for potential claims settlement**.

(d) As noted previously, **UNRWA funds** could also be used for such purposes, as a way of closing out UNRWA's programs.

(e) This approach could be seen as **a type of insurance**, since it might lead to greatly reduced risk of new construction being damaged in yet another conflict involving Gaza. Providing funds for resettlement/evacuation could also be required.

Violations

Those Gazans **proven through valid due process** to have violated the agreements could be stripped of citizenship and deported to other areas inside or outside of Gaza.

Conclusion

A direct settlement approach based on behavioral selection of those willing to settle a casus belli could enhance new moves for a resolution of the Gaza War initiated by Hamas on October 7, 2023.

The 21 point peace proposal released by POTUS on September 27, 2025, is reported to include provisions to offer "loyalty oaths" to Hamas members who wish to remain in Gaza.

At point 6 of the 21 Point Plan: "Once the hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful coexistence will be granted amnesty, while members who wish to leave the Strip will be granted safe passage to receiving countries."

These oaths would apparently involve a statement accepting the right of "Israel" to exist, presumably as a Jewish state, though the latter issue, as well as some others noted above, were not specified. (Michael Oren, September 29, 2025, Fox News interview.)

The recommendations suggested here would go well beyond offering an opportunity for Hamas members to take "oaths" to remain in Gaza.

Rather, the focus would be on a form of direct peace settlements with individual members of the civilian population.

The more such individuals were interested in cooperating in a peaceful manner with Israel, the more they would benefit in concrete ways.

This could undermine Hamas directly by creating incentives to, in effect, elect peace, regardless of what Hamas members might choose to do.

Once Hamas releases all Israeli hostages, if it agrees to the 21 point peace plan, it will already have been greatly disarmed.

After that, it could be very beneficial to focus on releasing Gazan civilians who feel that they have been, in effect, hostages of Hamas as well.

Direct settlement agreements could be an approach to achieve this important outcome.

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